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Abstract 
This paper illustrates a study conducted into the managerial practices implemented to mitigate the 
consequences of a major fire emergency and to promptly restore normal business operations at a large 
pediatric hospital. Stemming from prior research on crisis response and recovery in critical 
infrastructures, this investigation demonstrates that factors such as the complexity of the underlying 
stakeholder networks, the vulnerability of the involved actors, and several temporal and spatial 
constraints, all contribute in hampering the intervention of crisis managers. In these situations, relying 
on consolidated best practices may enable more rapid response and more adequate recovery. 
This study adopts a qualitative approach to build a retrospective case study that highlights the crucial 
issues that healthcare crisis managers are requested to face when exposed to thorny work conditions: 
presence of numerous actors from the public and the private sector, involvement of organizations 
with contrasting interests, need for a balance among public health, cost containment and legitimacy, 
etc. The findings of the present investigation expand the theoretical knowledge on the dynamics that 
characterize crises occurring at critical infrastructures and provide practical recommendations for 
healthcare emergency managers to improve their response to, and recovery from, major fire 
emergencies. 
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1. Introduction 
Extensive academic literature has been dedicated to the evaluation of emergency response plans 
in a variety of industries and events, such as natural hazards (An, Bai, Xu, Nie, & Wang, 2015; Bisri, 
2013), nuclear (Ten Hoeve & Jacobson, 2012), industrial (Krausmann, Cozzani, Salzano, & Renni, 
2011; Lindøe, Engen, & Olsen, 2011; Wei & Lu, 2015) and transport accidents (Carim Jr et al., 2016; 
Fan, Li, Pei, Li, & Sun, 2015). A burgeoning field of research, emergency management in the 
healthcare sector deserves further attention by researchers and practitioners, in order to diffuse best 
practices and reduce costs of accident prevention and response (Alves, Cagliuso, & Dunne, 2015; 
Lakbala, 2016; Orlando, Danna, Giarratano, Prepas, & Johnson, 2010). As critical infrastructures, 
modern hospitals are vital systems whose incapacitation ‘[…] would have a debilitating impact on 
national security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
these.’ (Sullivant, 2007, p. 538).  As a consequence, the amount of disaster planning and emergency 
preparation that modern hospitals are required to develop is significant (Bish, Agca, & Glick, 2014).  
The complexity that underlies healthcare operations in hospitals, coupled with the risks associated 
with an emergency, makes evacuations particularly delicate for emergency managers in the healthcare 
sector. During emergencies, complexity of operations in hospitals is exacerbated by a number of 
factors: presence of vulnerable patients (classified by severity and health conditions), presence of 
potentially dangerous substances (e.g., chemical and radiological) and the need for the evacuees to 
be constantly assisted. Furthermore, an acknowledged, natural proneness by the healthcare sector to 
be posed under strict scrutiny by the media (Wilmar, Ahlborg, Jacobsson, & Dellve, 2014) has the 
potential to exert further pressure on healthcare emergency managers. Natural hazards (earthquakes, 
floods, hurricanes, etc.) or human actions (deliberate or unintended) have in the past caused hospitals 
to implement their emergency plans in order to minimize risks for patients and staff members (Chavez 
& Binder, 1996; Schultz, Koenig, & Lewis, 2007; Sternberg, Lee, & Huard, 2004). Such emergency 
plans are based on a structured approach. 
The American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM) identifies four steps that are 
involved in emergency management in healthcare facilities: prevention, planning and preparation, 
implementation and response and recovery (Carroll, 2010). In the initial prevention phase, emphasis 
is placed on building robust internal reporting systems to detect early warnings of potential crises. In 
the planning and preparation stage, the emergency managers ensure that adequate emergency plans 
are effectively designed and maintained. In the implementation and response phase, the emergency 
plans are deployed and a first reaction to the events is provided. In the final recovery stage, financial, 
operational and psychological measures are taken in order to restore pre-crisis conditions. 
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The following table 1 summarizes several significant studies that have explored the different 
stages of the healthcare emergency management process, and provides an overview of their main 
focus areas and findings. 
Author(s), year Type(s) of 
threat 
Focus Stage(s) Main findings 
(Achour, Pascale, 
Soetanto, & Price, 
2015) 
All Emergency 
plans 
Planning and 
preparation 
UK healthcare emergency planning 
needs further integration of ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ resources. 
(Bish et al., 2014) All Evacuation 
models 
Implementation 
and response 
A model to evacuate critical patients 
in an emergency situation. 
(Chavez & Binder, 
1996) 
Earthquake Treatment 
of mass 
casualties 
All Emergency planning in hospitals is 
effectively complemented by training, 
communication and resource 
allocation. 
(Chien, Yu, Huang, 
& Chong, 2011) 
Fire Information 
systems 
Recovery Real-world testing of a web-based 
information system to effectively 
enhance business continuity after an 
emergency. 
(Chowdhury, 2014) Fire Root cause 
analysis 
Prevention Indian hospitals need to improve their 
handling of O2 in order to prevent fire 
risks. 
(Cone & Koenig, 
2005) 
Chemical, 
biological,  
radiological, 
nuclear 
Treatment 
of mass 
casualties 
Implementation 
and response 
Elaboration of chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear-compatible 
trauma triage algorithms. 
(Hertzberg, 
Blomqvist, & 
Tuovinen, 2007) 
Fire Toxicity 
indicators 
Prevention In Swedish hospitals, requirements 
for flooring materials should be the 
same as walls and ceiling to prevent 
toxic contamination in case of fire. 
(Moore, Geller, & 
Clark, 2015) 
Chemical, 
radiological 
Treatment 
of mass 
casualties 
Planning and 
preparation 
Recommendations to help hospitals 
prepare for chemical and radiological 
emergencies. 
(Niska & Shimizu, 
2011) 
All Emergency 
plans 
Planning and 
preparation 
In the US, hospitals are less prepared 
for explosive and incendiary incidents 
than for chemical, natural and 
biological events.  
(Schultz et al., 2007) Earthquake Evacuation 
models 
Prevention Peak ground acceleration is a superior 
risk indicator than distance from the 
epicenter for hospitals affected by 
earthquakes. 
(Sternberg et al., 
2004) 
All Evacuation 
models 
Implementation 
and response 
An overview of US hospital 
evacuations 1971-1999 highlights that 
more than 50% of cases originated for 
internal hazards, not for natural 
disasters. 
(Wetter, Daniell, & 
Tresser, 2001) 
Chemical, 
biological 
Emergency 
plans 
Planning and 
preparation 
In general, US hospital emergency 
departments are not prepared to treat 
victims of chemical or biological 
attacks. 
Table 1: Synthetic review of healthcare emergency management literature 
Research demonstrates that American healthcare facilities are more covered against other types 
of hazards than fire events (e.g., radiological, chemical, and nuclear attacks, biological accidents, 
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epidemics and pandemics) (Niska & Shimizu, 2011). An extensive body of academic studies in 
healthcare emergency management focuses on the aforementioned threats (see, among others, Cone 
& Koenig, 2005; Moore et al., 2015; Wetter et al., 2001). As illustrated in Table 1, academic research 
on healthcare emergency management seems to predominantly concentrate on other threats than fire 
events. Furthermore, the first two stages of the emergency management process, prevention and 
planning and preparation, attract most of the attention in the literature. 
Based on this overview, the scholarly literature needs additional, comprehensive studies exploring 
the effectiveness of implementation and response and recovery plans executed by healthcare 
facilities, especially in situations of fire emergencies. Recent research (Lu, Mei, Wang, & Zhang, 
2012) shows in fact that fire events in hospitals and healthcare facilities are usually associated with 
high fatality levels due to the relatively high vulnerability and low physical ability of their occupants. 
In the United States, the National Fire Protection Association has compiled an exhaustive report on 
the features of fire events in healthcare facilities (Ahrens, 2012). This report indicates that, on 
average, in the period 2006 – 2010, the US fire departments responded to 6,240 fire events per year 
in healthcare facilities. These caused an annual average of around six deaths, 171 injuries among 
civilians, and more the 52 million USD in property damage. Despite this, surprisingly, in 2008 less 
than 80% of hospitals in the US had emergency plans for explosive or incendiary incidents (Niska & 
Shimizu, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the scarce number of studies exploring the characteristics of fire emergencies in 
healthcare infrastructures, several exceptions exist. In their investigation on the recovery of fire-
damaged medical equipment, Chien, Yu, Huang and Chong (2011) illustrate the case of a fire event 
that occurred in a Taiwanese hospital and resulted in extensive damage to critical medical equipment. 
The researchers provide an overview of the disaster recovery process implemented after the event 
and emphasize the important support that appropriate web-based information systems can provide in 
maintaining adequate levels of care. Hertzberg, Blomqvist and Tuovinen (2007) investigate an arson 
hospital fire which occurred in Sweden and identify a number of factors that contributed to the event. 
Among these, besides the perpetrator’s deliberate act, the presence of easily ignitable materials in the 
mattresses and the flooring of the hospital’s bedrooms facilitated the diffusion of fire, smoke and 
toxic substances. The investigation conducted by Lu, Mei, Wang and Zhang (2012) applied the 
correspondence analysis technique to high-casualty fire data in China. This study highlights the 
associations between fatality levels and influence factors such as affected infrastructures, causes, 
time, month, year and location. The results demonstrate that fires in healthcare facilities tend to be 
strongly associated with high-fatality levels, especially when the origin of the fire event is task-related 
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(e.g., negligence by operators), the fires occur in the daytime during the cold months, and the fires 
affect facilities located in highly-populated areas (e.g., Beijing).      
 This review of the academic literature emphasizes the need for researchers and practitioners to 
further analyze the nature and characteristics of fire events developing in healthcare and assistance 
facilities. As previously discussed, these events have the potential to yield a higher number of 
casualties, when compared to other accidents and infrastructures (Lu et al., 2012). In order to address 
this acknowledged gap in the literature, the present paper explores a major fire event that occurred at 
a large pediatric hospital in Rome. The main objective of this article is to share an experience of 
emergency response and recovery from a fire event that affected a hospital operating in thorny 
conditions. Focus of the present paper is on the response to, and recovery from, a fire event that 
occurred at the ‘Bambino Gesù’ hospital (OPBG) in November 2010 ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 
2010b). 
1.2 The Hospital and the Fire Event 
The ‘Bambino Gesù’ (OPBG) is a Catholic, pediatric hospital and research center owned by 
the Vatican City, established in 1869 ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2015b). The hospital, which started 
as a room with four beds, is nowadays one of the largest pediatric hospitals and research centers in 
Europe. The OPBG is accredited under Joint Commission International, an independent organization 
that evaluates quality and patient safety in global health care (Joint Commission International, 2017). 
The hospital currently boasts occupancy of approximately 600 beds. Its occupancy rate was around 
91% in 2015. It has almost 2,600 staff members (in 2015, around 20% were contract workers) and 
each year provides over 1 million healthcare services to children and adolescents from all over the 
world ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2015a).  
Operations at the OPBG have been constantly expanding in the last years, as demonstrated in 
Table 2 below: 
 
Activity 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Difference 
(10-15) 
Hospitalizations 23,778 25,057 26,319 26,770 27,342 27,336 14.9% 
Consultations 1,001,882 1,131,264 1,139,450 1,411,517 1,589,080 1,639,658 63.6% 
Emergency 
visits 
59,113 63,121 70,911 72,744 77,232 78,849 33.3% 
Surgeries 20,427 21,943 25,815 28,131 28,300 26,166 28.1% 
Table 2: Operations at the OPBG ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2012, 2015a) 
 
On November the 5th 2010, at 3.10 pm, the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) located in ‘Pio XII’ 
pavilion, first floor, was affected by a fire emergency. A nurse had noticed smoke coming from the 
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head physician’s room. At that moment, ‘Pio XII’ pavilion hosted 55 patients, 9 of which were in the 
ICU. A total of 82 staff members were employed in the affected building. The security and the first 
response team were alerted and immediately reached the ICU. The Vatican City Fire Brigade and the 
Italian Fire Brigade were also alerted (3.20pm) and reached the hospital premises at 3.25pm and 
3.35pm. In the meantime, the hospital’s first response team, following the indications contained in 
the emergency plan, started assembling the fire hoses, which the Vatican City Fire Brigade then 
connected to their fire truck. The fire was extinguished before 3.35pm, but the smoke kept spreading 
and reached the nearby Pediatric Pathology ward and the stairs of the building. It took 20-25 minutes 
to completely evacuate the two involved wards (ICU and Pediatric Pathology) and fully contain the 
emergency. No major injuries resulted from the event, but many pieces of equipment were damaged 
due to the high temperature, the smoke, the ashes and the electrical short circuits generated by the 
water from the sprinklers and the hoses. A report elaborated by the Vatican City Fire Brigade, and 
confirmed by the Italian Fire Brigade, indicated that the fire event was likely caused by an electrical 
short-circuit that affected a computer in the head physician’s room (Vatican City Fire Brigade, 2010).    
 
2. Research Methods 
This paper aims at providing an overview of the ways in which modern, large-scale hospitals 
can manage a fire event by implementing an effective emergency management plan. To do so, a single 
case study approach is adopted. Case study research consists of a detailed exploration that attempts 
to provide an analysis of the context and processes involved in a phenomenon under investigation 
(Yin, 2009). A case study methodology is appropriate when contemporary events are analyzed, when 
the boundaries between these and the context are not entirely clear, and when organizational, social 
and political phenomena are investigated (Yin, 2009). Most important, case study research is mainly 
exploratory and particularly useful when used to study underexplored concepts such as the response 
and recovery stages of a fire emergency in a large healthcare facility. This investigation utilized a 
retrospective case study methodology, in which data were collected after the analyzed event had 
occurred; researchers had access to both primary and secondary data sources; and an illustration of 
the chain of events that characterized the fire emergency under study was possible at the moment of 
the research. A retrospective case study design is particularly suitable to examine an extreme case 
that has a distinctive value (Street & Ward, 2010) such as a fire emergency in a pediatric hospital, a 
critical instance of healthcare emergency management. 
In order to nurture the case study, this investigation mainly utilized two methodologies: 
document analysis and informal interviews. As for the former, the most important source of 
information was constituted by an internal report elaborated by the Enterprise Risk Management 
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department of the hospital ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). Information contained in this 
document was drawn from the informal interviews conducted in the days following the event, together 
with technical reports produced after the emergency. Data on the case were also drawn from other 
organizational documents such as the Emergency and Evacuation Plan (EEP), the Risk Assessment 
and Management Plan (RAMP), the Corporate Improvement Plan (CIP), the Italian and Vatican City 
Fire Brigades technical inquiries, damage assessment technical reports, and several legal and 
organizational procedure manuals. Articles from three newspapers were also used to provide further 
information on the events.  
Eighteen informal interviews were conducted by members of the hospital’s Prevention and 
Protection Service with people directly or indirectly involved in the event, in the timeframe 5 – 24 
November 2010. Interviews revolved around the perceptions that respondents had on the response 
and recovery phases of the event. Table 3 illustrates the sample of interviewees. Due to the 
confidential nature of the information provided, personal identities (e.g., names, job titles, etc.) are 
not disclosed. Interviewees were recruited via email, based on their presence at the moment of the 
fire and their involvement in the response and recovery stages. Official investigations by the Police 
and the Fire Brigade to assess responsibilities in the event were ongoing at the moment of the 
interviews, which could not be recorded. However, interviewers were able to take notes on the 
responses provided by the participants. As previously mentioned, data collected during the interviews 
were utilized by members of the Prevention and Protection Service to produce the internal report 
("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b).  
Organization Department Number of interviewees 
(function) 
OPBG ICU 1 (admin.) – 4 (doctor/nurse) 
OPBG Pediatric Pathology 1 (doctor/nurse) 
OPBG Traumatology 2 (doctor/nurse) 
OPBG Surgery 2 (doctor/nurse) 
OPBG Security 3 (first response) 
OPBG Maintenance 1 (supervisor) 
Italian Fire brigade - 2 (manager) 
Contract organization Cleaning 1 (supervisor) 
Contract organization ICU 1 (doctor/nurse) 
Table 3: Sample for the informal interviews 
   
Document analysis was mainly utilized to gather data about the chain of events that 
characterized the fire event, the response and the recovery stages. Informal interviews were primarily 
used to explore the perceptions of the protagonists on the same stages. Both sources of data were also 
utilized to provide an assessment of the performance of the response to, and recovery from, the fire 
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emergency. In particular, the official Fire Brigade technical inquiry and the damage assessment 
technical report provided relevant information on this last point.  
Once collected, data were prepared for analysis. The researchers surveyed the documents to 
be included in the document analysis and verified the completeness of the available material. Data 
analysis was then executed by identifying recurring themes. The first level of analysis utilized the 
four stages of emergency management in healthcare facilities identified by the American Society for 
Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM) (Carroll, 2010) to isolate the implementation and response 
and recovery actions executed by the OPBG. The second level of analysis focused on each of the two 
stages and provided a taxonomy of sub-stages for effective healthcare emergency management. These 
taxonomies are reflected in the structure of the results section of the present paper (Section 3). 
As a qualitative piece of research, this paper is assessed against the four criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Shenton, 2004). 
First, credibility of the present investigation is ensured in three ways (Patton, 2002): by applying 
rigorous methods described in detail in the present section of the paper; by leveraging the credibility 
of the researchers involved in the informal interviews, subject matter experts belonging to the 
Prevention and Protection Service of the OPBG; and by adhering to a philosophical belief in the value 
of qualitative research. Second, given the limited transferability of findings from which case studies 
typically suffer, the present paper itemizes in detail the adopted methodology, in order to provide a 
blueprint for other researcher to replicate it (Shenton, 2004). This was achieved within the 
methodological boundaries imposed by the retrospective approach adopted in the study, which 
focused on an extreme case with a distinctive value. Third, dependability indicates that a study obtains 
the same results when repeated under the same conditions. In order to overcome the limitations 
intrinsic to qualitative research, this investigation was conducted with a robust case study protocol 
(data collection and analysis methodologies follow best practices in qualitative research), elaborated 
around a sound case study database (Yin, 2009), composed by the variety of information sources 
reported in the present section. Fourth, confirmability (or objectivity) of the research was achieved 
by providing both within method triangulation (using different documents for the data analysis, such 
as technical reports and newspapers articles) and across method triangulation (informal interviews 
integrated information that was drawn from document analysis) (Yin, 2009).  
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3. Results 
3.1 Implementation and Response Stage 
The implementation and response stage to the fire emergency was ensured by the OPBG 
managers by activating the emergency plan and executing specific actions, aimed at mitigating the 
immediate impact of the emergency. These actions were dictated by the Emergency and Evacuation 
Plan (EEP) in effect at the moment of the fire event ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010c). The EEP 
illustrates in particular the pathways to be taken to reach the nearest emergency exit. Furthermore, 
the EEP provides the layout of the fire prevention system, with details on the location of sprinklers, 
extinguishers, hydrants, hoses, etc. According to the EEP, the fire emergency procedure is initiated 
through these steps: 
- Warning procedure: in presence of an imminent danger (e.g., smoke, flames, explosions, 
collapses, leakage of flammable substances, etc.) any staff members phones security and 
provides details of the event (e.g., location, features, etc.); simultaneously, 
- First appraisal procedure: the trained staff members initiate a first assessment of the 
emergency; 
- Reception of the warning: security requests detailed information about the event and 
contacts the first response team; 
- First response: any staff members involved in the emergency execute the first response 
activities, which include: establishing if the fire can be managed with the nearby 
equipment; assist people in life-threatening conditions; close fire doors to contain smoke, 
heat and flames; count staff members and patients; provide clear information to the 
patients and their families; etc. 
Response to the fire event was characterized in particular by the following sub-stages, 
identified as recurring themes in the collected data: Patient Evacuation, Management of Fire-Exposed 
Rooms, Patient and Family Support, Monitoring of Fire-Exposed Workers, Contamination Tests and 
Insurance Inspections/Damaged Equipment. 
Patient Evacuation. At the moment of the fire event, in the ICU there were two doctors, 7 
nurses, a clerk assistant, a healthcare assistant, 9 young patients and some parents of the patients who 
were in a waiting room close by. As the smoke infiltrated the whole ward, bag valve masks were 
utilized to transfer 8 patients to other wards on the same floor. The remaining patient had more 
complex needs as she required dialysis and artificial respiration. She was therefore kept in her room 
with her doctors and parents until safe conditions for evacuation were established. All the ICU 
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patients and staff members were safely evacuated without anyone suffering from extensive smoke 
inhalation ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). 
Management of Fire-Exposed Rooms. Eight wards and units in the building exposed to the 
fire were temporarily redirected into other facilities of the OPBG. Due to the immediate use of backup 
technology, assistance to critical patients was ensured and basic life services were maintained (Isman, 
2010). Damage directly caused by the fire was limited to the head physician’s room and a few 
surrounding rooms. Further damage was indirectly caused by the fire: the combustion of PVC pipes 
and electric cables released corrosive chlorides which extensively contaminated part of ‘Pio XII’ 
pavilion. Additionally, minor damage was caused by the use of water from the fire hoses, in particular 
to the floors below. The following figures 1 and 2 illustrate the damage caused by the fire (Vatican 
City Fire Brigade, 2010).  
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In order to secure the building, pavilion ‘Pio XII’ was temporarily locked down. This pavilion 
suffered from significant damage not only due to the fire, but also because of the smoke 
contamination. Given the nature of the environment, all contaminated material had to be removed 
and verified for integrity. Access was temporarily prohibited until the building was secured by means 
Figure 1: Corridor of the ICU after the fire event (photo by Vatican City Fire Brigade) 
Figure 2: Head physician's room after the fire event (photo by Vatican City Fire Brigade) 
12 
 
of specific interventions. These interventions are summarized in Table 4 below ("Bambino Gesú" 
Hospital, 2010b). 
 
Management of Fire Exposed Rooms Location 
Collapsing walls and false ceilings demolished ICU 
Water used to extinguish the fire dried by means of fans ICU and wards below ICU 
Temporary protection devices put on damaged windows ICU and Pediatric 
Pathology 
Air Handling Units (AHU) filters substituted ICU and Pediatric 
Pathology 
Integrity of technological equipment (PCs, phones, faxes, servers, etc.) 
verified 
ICU and Pediatric 
Pathology 
Fire prevention devices (extinguishers, gas masks, fire hoses, etc.) replaced  ‘Pio XII’ pavilion 
Affected furniture removed and securely stored ICU and Pediatric 
Pathology 
Drugs, disposables and medical devices affected by the fire or contaminated 
by the smoke removed and securely stored 
ICU and Pediatric 
Pathology 
Table 4: Interventions to Manage Fire-Exposed Rooms 
 
In order to preserve the ongoing, normal business operations at the Hospital, the day after the 
event, wards in ‘Pio XII’ pavilion were reorganized and moved to other locations within the precinct. 
A total of 91 hospital beds were relocated within two days, as Table 5 below indicates ("Bambino 
Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). 
 
Ward Beds Pre-event location Post-event location Date  
Intensive Care Unit 8 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 1st 
Floor 
Ground Floor, OBI-DEA1 6th November 
Neonatal Pathology 15 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 1st 
Floor 
Second Floor, ‘GPII’ 
pavilion 
6th November 
Perinatal 
emergency therapy 
3 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 2nd 
Floor 
Ground Floor, OBI-DEA 6th November 
Immature 12 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 2nd 
Floor 
Second Floor, ‘GPII’ 
pavilion 
6th November 
Neonatal Surgery 15 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 3rd 
Floor 
Second Floor, ‘GPII’ 
pavilion 
6th November 
Neurotraumatology 2 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 3rd 
Floor 
Second Floor, ‘Ford’ 
pavilion 
6th November 
Hepato-
gastroenterology 
14 ‘Pio XII’ pavilion, 4th 
Floor 
Second Floor, ‘S. Onofrio’ 
pavilion 
7th November 
Pediatrics II 22 ‘‘GPII’’ pavilion, 2nd 
Floor 
Fourth Floor, ‘Pio XII’ 
pavilion 
8th November 
Table 5: Relocation of Affected Wards 
 
Patient and Family Support. After the fire event, the physical wellbeing of patients and 
families was addressed as the absolute priority. No major injury was caused to anyone by the fire 
                                                 
1 OBI: Intensive Short Observation (Osservazione Breve Intensiva); DEA: Emergency and Triage Department 
(Dipartimento di Emergenza ed Accettazione).  
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(ANSA, 2010). In the days following the event, eight critical patients were transferred to other 
hospitals in Rome, due to the reduced capacity of ‘Pio XII’ pavilion (Il Messaggero, 2010). In order 
to address the psychological issues related to the accident, two days after the fire event an emergency 
speak up was activated by the Health Management Office. In particular, items lost by the patients and 
their families during the fire were classified and, where possible, salvaged. Free accommodation was 
provided to single mothers and fathers that had their children hospitalized. Psychologists activated a 
support service and provided free assistance to the affected families ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 
2010b). 
Monitoring of Fire-Exposed Workers. Apart from the patients and their families, some 50 
people involved in the fire event required medical attention over the following days ("Bambino Gesú" 
Hospital, 2010b; Isman, 2010). Their wellbeing was monitored by a special service provided by the 
OPBG. In some cases, people were hospitalized in external facilities. Post-traumatic disorders were 
monitored. OPBG staff members, doctors, nurses, security and first response team staff involved in 
the evacuation, contract workers, etc. only had minor health issues (nausea, headache, cough, heavy 
respiration, etc.). These resulted in sick leaves ranging from zero to 7 days, with an average of 2.7 
("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). However, psychological issues (e.g., insomnia, phobia and 
nightmares) lasted longer and affected more intensively those that more actively participated in the 
emergency and the subsequent evacuation. 
Contamination Tests. A fire in an environment containing plastic materials rapidly develops 
contaminants which can damage any type of equipment. When the temperature reaches around 300 
degrees, 80% of the chlorine contained in the polyvinylchloride (PVC) has already been released in 
the surrounding environment (Saeed, Tohka, Zevenhoven, & Haapala, 2005). Furthermore, 
hydrochloric acid is produced by the reaction between the chlorine and the water utilized to extinguish 
the fire. Current practice indicates the following limits for chlorine contamination: 5μg/cm² in case 
of electrical systems and 10μg/cm² in case of iron parts ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010a). 
At the OPBG, the fire burnt the PVC of which the floors, the equipment and the electrical 
systems of the affected wards were made. In order to assess the presence of contaminants resulting 
from the fire, quick tests were conducted on equipment, machinery and devices in the affected rooms. 
Table 6 below illustrates the most relevant measurements that emerged from the quick tests. 
 
Item Location/Description Test results 
1 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor – Fire area Total destruction of equipment, 
machinery and devices 
2 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor –Room 3 – Vertical surface 5-10 µg Cl/cm2 
3 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor –Room 3 – Patients monitor 5-10 µg Cl/cm2 
4 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor –Hallway- Electric dashboard 15/20 µg Cl/cm2 
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5 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor –Hallway- Furniture <5 µg Cl/cm2 
6 Neonatal Pathology – 1st floor –Room 2 – Nozzle A/C 15/20 µg Cl/cm2 
7 Basement - Dialysis device 15/20 µg Cl/cm2 
8 Basement –Blood refrigerators 5/10 µg Cl/cm2 
10 Perinatal emergency therapy - 2nd – Hallway - Electric 
dashboard 
<5 µg Cl/cm2 
12 Perinatal emergency therapy - -2nd –Incubator doctors room 5/10 µg Cl/cm2 
14 Perinatal emergency therapy - -2nd – Lift door 5/10 µg Cl/cm2 
15 Neonatal Surgery - -3rd – Hallway - Electric dashboard No pollution 
16 Neonatal Surgery - -3rd – Hallway –False ceiling No pollution 
18 Internal surface AHU n. 34  >20 µg Cl/cm2 
Table 6: Contamination Quick Tests Results 
Insurance Inspections and Damaged Equipment. A managerial task force was organized the 
day after the fire in order to make the compensation process quicker and more effective. All key-
competencies were grouped in the Task Force, under the supervision of the Enterprise Risk 
Management General Manager: Enterprise Risk Management, Technical Services, Medical 
Engineering, IT Systems, Legal Office, Logistics, Budget, Forensic Scientist, and Human Resources. 
Furthermore, an external, technical consultant was hired to assist the OPBG in the damage evaluation 
and compensation. A total of 544 units of medical equipment were damaged by the fire, by the 
contaminants or by the water utilized to extinguish the fire ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010a). These 
included artificial respiration units, incubators, dialysis equipment, defibrillators, nitric oxide units, 
monitors, personal computers, printers, etc. 
The aforementioned pieces of equipment were inspected and classified as follows: 
1. Destroyed or irreparable – to be replaced (9 units) 
2. Reparable, but life-supporting – to be replaced (also in case of restoration, as the manufacturer 
did not guarantee their reliability, 221) 
3. Reparable, non-life supporting, whose restoration was cheaper than replacement – to be 
restored (85) 
4. Reparable, but whose restoration was more expensive than replacement – to be replaced (93) 
5. Third-party equipment – no action taken (136) 
Particular attention was also paid to economic losses stemming from the temporary suspension 
of healthcare services. However, these losses were not covered by any insurance. This last point was 
addressed in the recovery stage, as discussed in section 3.2. 
3.2 Recovery Stage 
The fire event was an occasion for the OPBG to learn from experience and activate measures 
to improve safety and security in the hospital precinct. At the moment of the fire, an upgrade of the 
hospital facilities was being carried out, according to the pre-existing Hospital Strategic Plan. The 
emergency described in this paper provided further momentum for the implementation of an 
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improved version of such plan ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). In order to restore the pre-
emergency situation and implement more effective crisis management instruments, post-emergency 
recovery was carried out through the following activities: Improvement of Fire Protection Systems, 
Improvement of Communications Systems, Training of Employees and Contract Workers against 
Fire Emergencies, Improvement of Emergency Vehicle Access, Fire Safety Training for Fire Brigade, 
Customization of the Emergency Plan to Radioactive Substances, Improvement of the Insurance 
Policy, Development of an Occupational Health and Safety Management System and Implementation 
of a Healthcare Risk Management Plan. 
Improvement of Fire Protection Systems. The fire detection devices existing at the hospital 
at the moment of the emergency differed substantially in terms of employed technology. Over the 
years, several refurbishment works took place in the different areas of the OPBG. As a result, at the 
time of the fire, the fire alarms could not be simultaneously monitored from a single location but had 
to be directly inspected on site, as they were being activated. After the event, the existing fire 
protection systems were improved by means of more modern technologies. The old, non-centralized 
fire alarms were substituted by a new, centralized system that monitors all alarms in a unique, man-
manned control room. 
Improvement of Communication Systems. The fire event highlighted some weaknesses in the 
existing communication system ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). During the evacuation, the high 
number of emergency calls made, from inside and outside the hospital, originated congestion in the 
landlines. This forced the First Response Team to use the hospital telephone exchange system, which 
slowed down rescue operations. Also, mobile communication was hampered by the number of 
incoming phone calls. In order to address these issues, priority phone call models were organized and 
specific communication slots were allocated within the hospital telephone exchange system in case 
of emergency. Furthermore, the First Response Team members were provided with walkie-talkies, in 
order to ensure a more direct and coordinated communication than the mobile phones. 
Training of Employees and Contract Workers against Fire Emergencies. Overall, staff 
members involved in the accident response and recovery demonstrated adequate preparedness to deal 
with the fire emergency ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). In the days following the event, the 
Secretary of the Vatican State paid tribute to ‘…the competence and dedication of the personnel of 
the OPBG and the Fire Brigades, who […] made it possible for all the patients to be rescued with no 
harm’ (Il Messaggero, 2010, p. 2). The report elaborated by the Enterprise Risk Management 
department of the hospital ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b) highlighted two areas for 
improvement: first, some of the fire doors between the ICU and the stairwell were not properly closed 
by the personnel of the First Response team; second, some of the workers involved in the event 
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entered the already evacuated rooms once these were completely filled with smoke, which could 
potentially hamper, and not facilitate, the emergency response. The OPBG decided therefore to 
enhance its investments to improve workforce training in the field of risk management ("Bambino 
Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). Conversely, issues about the level of training were identified for some 
contract workers employed in the First Response Team (nurses, healthcare assistants, technicians, 
etc.). Thus, cooperation among the different employers and contract workers involved in the First 
Response Team was improved and specific Fire Safety training organized. Moreover, specific clauses 
to make Fire Safety training compulsory (either provided by the contract workers’ employers or by 
the OPBG in exchange for adequate savings) were established in all work contracts. 
Improvement of Emergency Vehicle Access. Given the location of the OPBG, at the heart of 
a busy area in Rome, traffic has always been a problem around the hospital. During the fire event, 
firefighters struggled to access the OPBG, due to several illegally parked cars on the square in front 
of the building. After the event, OPBG management officially required the Municipality of Rome to 
strengthen their patrols in that area. Local Police was also asked to improve vertical and horizontal 
road signs ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). 
Fire Safety Training for Fire Brigade. One of the issues that emerged from the event was the 
unfamiliarity with the facilities of the OPBG by some firefighters. Especially the less knowledgeable 
ones experienced some disorientation when they accessed the hospital buildings during the fire 
evacuation ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). This resulted in slower operations. In order to address 
this issue in the post-event phase, the OPBG started organizing regular fire safety drills at the hospital 
buildings involving the local Fire Brigade. 
Customization of the Emergency Plan to Radioactive Substances. The fire event described 
in the present paper did not involve the radioactive substances present in the hospital (for therapeutic, 
diagnostic and research purposes). Despite this, concern was raised by the emergency about the threat 
represented by the release in the atmosphere of radioactive substances following a fire event. For this 
purpose, the OPBG elaborated a specific emergency plan to manage an accident involving radioactive 
substances. Training of First Response Team members and OPBG employees was strengthened to 
face such an emergency ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). 
Improvement of the Insurance Policy. After the event, changes were made to the insurance 
policy covering activities at the OPBG in order to: 1) extend the coverage to the economic losses 
resulting from suspended healthcare activity in case of emergency; and 2) cover for third-party goods, 
equipment and devices, not covered at the moment of the fire. Furthermore, a clause in the insurance 
policy was added to link the premium to improvements made by the OPBG in the field of risk 
prevention. 
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Development of an Occupational Health and Safety Management System. The fire event 
boosted the implementation of a new Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OHSMS) 
by the hospital. Purpose of this new OHSMS was not only to fulfill administrative requirements 
established by law, but also to achieve specific goals in public health and safety (e.g., reduction of 
costs associated with OHS accidents and risks; increase of efficiency and effectiveness; and 
improvement of internal and external reputation). 
Implementation of a Healthcare Risk Management Model. The OPBG launched a study on 
the implementation of a Healthcare Risk Management model. Purpose of this model was to improve 
the hospital’s preparedness to emergencies by addressing case-specific issues in healthcare 
management ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). 
3.3 Perceptions on the Fire Event 
The official enquiries conducted by the Fire Brigade and the magistrate did not result in 
criminal charges against the hospital. Secondary data can be utilized to further elaborate on the 
general public’s opinion around the crisis response and recovery. In an interview granted to the Italian 
press agency ANSA, the then-mayor of Rome declared: ‘It’s been a real miracle. […] The good news 
is that all the emergency services worked really well, in a coordinated fashion, the Civil Protection 
Agency and the Fire Brigades, the Police, the Carabinieri2, as well as the great response capabilities 
of the hospital’s personnel. Their quick and effective response has avoided a tragedy.’ (ANSA, 2010, 
p. 2, authors' translation). A woman, interviewed by the newspaper La Repubblica (Isman, 2010, p. 
2, authors' translation), declared that the response provided by the hospital’s personnel ‘was quick, so 
that the worst consequences could be avoided.’. The relatives of some patients expressed their 
concern about the fact that at the moment of the event they did not hear the fire alarm: ‘I was on the 
stairs […] I was there when […] the children were taken outside. I did not hear the fire alarm, neither 
did I notice water coming out, as one would expect. […] Several parents declared they did not hear 
the alarm.’ (ANSA, 2010, p. 1, authors' translation). On the same issue, a father declared the 
following: ‘I did not hear the alarm either. I believe that if the fire alarm of such a big infrastructure 
went off, it would have been heard across the whole Rome.’ He nonetheless conceded the following, 
on the circumstances of the emergency: ‘Obviously, everything happened in a situation of great 
personal excitement, and I cannot be absolutely certain that I haven’t missed something.’ (ANSA, 
2010, p. 2, authors' translation).   
 
                                                 
2 The Carabinieri is an Italian law enforcement agency under the Ministry of Defense, with similar competences to the 
Police. 
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4. Discussion 
The present paper illustrates the steps accomplished by a pediatric hospital in responding to, 
and recovering from, a major fire event that occurred in one of its wards. This process was not free 
from hurdles. Apart from an acknowledged propensity for organizational crises intrinsic to large-
scale healthcare facilities (Hollnagel, Wears, & Braithwaite, 2015), several critical features 
characterize the OPBG. First, as a pediatric hospital, the OPBG hosts young patients with very 
different clinical records and a broad spectrum of treated pathologies. Second, the hospital’s 
occupancy rate is usually very high (see Section 1.2). Third, the hospital’s business model implies 
high presence of contract workers on site, with different duties and contractual arrangements (see 
section 1.2). Fourth, given the age of the patients, there is constant presence of parents and family 
members on the premises, also overnight. Fifth, given the hospital’s location at the heart of a busy 
residential area, also the buildings surrounding the hospital facilities are characterized by high 
occupancy rate. Lastly, even though the hospital lies on Italian soil, is subject to the Vatican City 
jurisdiction. This translates into jurisdictional complexity and may potentially jeopardize quick 
response in case of accidents. Considered altogether, the aforementioned characteristics of the OPBG 
generate institutional complexity and potential for organizational vulnerability (Lukasik, 2003). 
These critical features are associated with physical (geographic location), institutional (pediatric 
hospital treating a number of pathologies), business model (presence of contract workers and high 
occupancy rate) and regulatory characteristics (Vatican City jurisdiction). The combination of these 
factors presents a threat to effective emergency response and recovery. In the explored case, 
organizational complexity translated into fragmented communication systems, uneven fire detection 
coverage and sub-optimal levels of training. This had an impact on the response and recovery stages 
of the emergency, although it did not compromise their effectiveness. 
4.1 Implementation and response stage 
Literature shows that organizations that effectively learn from past emergencies enjoy a 
greater deal of resilience, in that they develop the potential for avoiding future crises or being 
prepared when these occur (Smith, 2005). In the healthcare sector, resilience has been defined as ‘the 
ability of an organization to adapt to pressures and still produce good outcomes.’ (Hollnagel et al., 
2015). This definition implies that, in order to be considered resilient, healthcare organizations such 
as hospitals should enhance their adaptive capacity (ability to react to pressures) to produce good 
outcomes, with a focus on learning and adaptation (Barach & Johnson, 2006). Immersed in the 
complexity of the healthcare industry, workers need to be able to safely adapt to an environment that 
constantly changes, and in which linear cause-event-consequence processes are often impossible to 
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ascertain (Ross & Anderson, 2015). The fire event described in the present paper illustrates the 
importance that business continuity management has for healthcare organizations, an aspect also 
emphasized in the literature (Devlen, 2009). Intended as ‘a decision-making process aimed at 
minimizing business loss and maximizing business recovery’ (Geelen-Baass & Johnstone, 2008, p. 
162), an appropriate business continuity management system strengthens an hospital’s resilience in 
the face of disasters. The present case study focuses on the implementation and response and recovery 
stages of healthcare emergency management as identified by the AHSRM (Carroll, 2010). Specific 
business continuity management components have been indicated to align to the emergency 
management phases (Devlen, 2009), in particular plan activation, emergency response and 
operations, incident command and emergency operations centers. After an initial assessment of the 
fire event, the OPBG personnel activated the EEP (implementation) to initiate the reaction to the fire 
event (response). Patient evacuation constituted the most compelling priority for the emergency 
personnel, as well as the first step to ensure business continuity for healthcare operations. The affected 
wards were relocated within two days following the event. Although slowed down in some cases, 
normal operations at the OPBG could be maintained with no major hindrance. Only the Emergency 
Department was declared temporarily closed (until 9am of the following day), in order to prioritize 
assistance to the people involved in the fire event (Il Messaggero, 2010). Response to the fire event 
was then completed by focusing on the remaining three categories of subjects affected by the 
emergency: the families of the patients, the workers and the physical assets. As for the first two 
categories, the response of the OPBG was organized around providing psychological (emergency 
speak up) as well as physical assistance (free accommodation for the parents of the patients), 
according to best practices acknowledged in the literature (Devlen, 2009). As for the management of 
the physical assets damaged in various ways by the event (fire, heat, water, chemicals, etc.), the OPBG 
immediately initiated the removal process, as well as the contamination tests to verify the extent of 
the chemical contamination. This part of the response stage merged into the inspections executed for 
insurance purposes, which eventually resulted in the hospital negotiating new insurance policies to 
cover for a broader spectrum of economic losses deriving from similar accidents.  
The role of parents and relatives of the patients in the response phase of the emergency 
constitutes an interesting topic for further discussion. On the one hand, in fact, as demonstrated by 
research conducted on a similar accidental event (Hunte, 2015) supplementing the prescribed 
emergency response system with additional support from other providers allows the flexibility that 
an hospital needs to ‘fill the gaps’ and effectively respond to an emergency. In the case described in 
the present paper, parents and relatives of the patients at the OPBG actively contributed to the 
evacuation, as witnessed by the following excerpt: ‘In those moments, we all tried to help, many 
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mothers and nurses carried the children to take them to a safe place’ (Isman, 2010, p. 2, authors' 
translation). On the other hand, the fire event at the OPBG seems to contradict scholarly literature 
that indicates how parents of children undergoing specific treatments have the potential to facilitate 
systemic resilience in case of emergency. Schubert, Wears, Holden and Hunte (2015) illustrate the 
case of the mother of a patient treated for cancer who also needed to undergo a dental procedure. 
When the dental nurse approached the young patient to floss him, the mother stopped her, remarking 
that her son’s blood count for the day was unknown, and using the floss could have had adverse 
consequences on him. The authors underline how parents of children undergoing specific treatments 
(in this case, for cancer) have a great involvement in their children’s health conditions and are able 
to anticipate, monitor, and recover from, dangerous situations. The contrary was experienced during 
the response stage of the fire event at the OPBG. During the rescue operations, several people 
witnessed instances in which mothers of young patients attempted to frantically pull off drip-feeds 
and oxygen tubes from their children in order to carry them away. Doctors and nurses were seen 
yelling at them not to do so (Isman, 2010). In this case, in spite of the mothers’ genuine intentions, 
their involvement in the emergency operations made them over-react to the circumstances, at the risk 
of jeopardizing the well-being of their children, who needed to be evacuated in safe conditions. 
Time is one of the most compelling issues with emergency management in healthcare critical 
infrastructures, as demonstrated in a number of eminent cases reported in the literature (Bish et al., 
2014; Schultz et al., 2007). The literature defines response time as the ‘time required by the 
emergency services to reach the incident point after getting incident information’ (Bandyopadhyay 
& Singh, 2016, p. 138). In the case of healthcare facilities, the presence of personnel specifically 
trained to face large-scale emergencies, is meant to reduce the response time and enable an effective 
reaction to the crises before the arrival of dedicated emergency services. In spite of the presence of 
qualified staff, emergency response at the OPBG was naturally hampered by the location of the 
precinct, situated in a particularly congested neighborhood of Rome. Response time was also 
increased by the presence of several vehicles illegally parked on the path of the Fire Brigade. In spite 
of this, once alerted, the Vatican City Fire Brigade managed to cover the distance to the OPBG 
(around 3 km) in only 5 minutes. The Italian Fire Brigade provided additional services and reached 
the hospital (around 5 km distance) in less than 10 minutes.         
4.2 Recovery stage 
In terms of emergency recovery, the fire event at the OPBG epitomizes some of the crucial 
capabilities that complex healthcare organizations need to deploy to build their resilience (Hollnagel 
et al., 2015) and in particular learning, anticipation, monitoring and response. Several measures taken 
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in the post-emergency phase witness the organizational learning process that the OPBG has 
implemented since the fire event: the identification of sub-optimal emergency management practices 
at the moment of the fire (e.g., non-centralized fire alarms, gaps in the communication systems, 
difficult access to the precinct by the emergency vehicles, etc.) has been followed-up by related 
improvements. These contribute in the direction of anticipating a similar event in the future and 
monitoring its consequences (e.g., by defining an emergency plan specific for radioactive substances; 
by creating a centralized control room for fire alarms; etc.) and improving the response capabilities 
of the hospital (e.g., by harmonizing internal communication systems). Another improvement can be 
ascribed to the learning category of counter-measures to build organizational resilience. In the area 
of training, the OPBG has taken steps to harmonize the ways in which safety training is delivered to 
all workers employed in the hospital precinct, including contract workers. In the risk management 
literature, institutional complexity is often indicated as a source of vulnerability that has the potential 
to lead to major crises (Lukasik, 2003). In this scenario of complexity, the effectiveness of safety best 
practices can be down-watered by the contractual arrangements in place in organizations. Managerial 
supervision is less effective when different companies work together and responsibilities are not 
always clear. In order to face this issue, after the fire event, the OPBG implemented stricter 
contractual provisions, for example by including specific clauses for fire safety training. On a similar 
note, in order to attract additional energies to deploy in case of emergency, the hospital strengthened 
its collaboration with the local city council to improve vehicular traffic management around the 
precinct. 
4.3 Challenges in Emergency Management 
Assessing the effectiveness of the emergency management activities delivered in response to 
a major accident in a large-scale critical infrastructure is a difficult exercise. It requires a mix of 
benchmarking techniques, standard assessment criteria, quantitative information around losses and 
costs associated to a disruptive event, and qualitative data about the perceptions of the involved actors. 
For various reasons, the present retrospective case study lacks some of the aforementioned 
components of a solid performance measurement instrument. However, some performance-related 
remarks on the response and recovery activities executed during and after the fire event that affected 
the OPBG can be made. Boin and ‘t Hart (2010, p. 380) identify a number of challenges typically 
faced by incident commanders and operations managers in crisis response. Diagnosing and deciding 
refers to the situational awareness necessary to initiate the crisis response process, based on available 
information (often incomplete) and under time pressure, in a constantly changing environment. Once 
informed of the fire, the First Response team of the OPBG immediately initiated the procedures 
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required by the EEP, which constituted a regulatory instrument supporting decision-making in 
conditions of extreme uncertainty (about the extent and development of the fire, etc.). Mobilising and 
organising refers to the quick solicitation and the orderly deployment of the available operational 
resources to face the crisis. The timely implementation of the EEP contributed in activating the 
different organizational components responsible for dealing with the emergency (i.e. nurses and 
doctors, security and First Response team, etc.). Evacuation was carried out at full speed, with some 
disruption caused by the excitement of parents and relatives of the patients and the mix with the 
emergency services (‘…there were flames, and amidst the general panic somebody broke the glasses 
to let the smoke out. In these streets there was an impressive back and forth of ambulances…’ (Isman, 
2010, p. 1, authors' translation). Containing and mitigating involves reducing the impact of the threat, 
which in the case described in this paper was possible due to the combined action of the OPBG 
personnel and the quick intervention by the Fire Brigades (the fire was extinguished in less than 25 
minutes since smoke was first noticed). Informing and empowering refers to the need for involved 
organizations to adequately inform the relevant stakeholders of the crisis and its consequences. The 
prompt response to the emergency demonstrates that the chain of command in place at the moment 
of the fire well functioned, despite some drawbacks in the communication systems. Mobile and 
landline phone communication experienced congestion, which somehow slowed down the emergency 
response activities ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b). For similar reasons, the equipment utilized by 
the First Response team during the crisis (e.g., mobile phones) did not allow an immediate 
information exchange among its members. As highlighted in the findings of the present study, the 
OPBG has addressed these areas for improvement. Data collected during the present investigation 
only marginally refer to the crisis communication activities carried out by the OPBG in the recovery 
stage (e.g., the speak up service implemented by the hospital), an area worth further exploration. The 
final crisis management challenge identified by Boin and ‘t Hart is coordinating and collaborating 
and refers to the need for crisis managers to make sure involved organizations (public and private) 
effectively collaborate in facing the emergency. This case emphasized some limitations in the crisis 
response, which can be attributed to the variety of institutional arrangements that the organizations 
involved in the fire event had. An example of this is the gap in training requirements that some 
contract workers involved in the First Response team had. In the recovery phase, the OPBG 
strengthened its collaboration with the contracted companies to ensure adequate levels of training on 
emergency management were delivered. 
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4.4 Research limitations 
Due to the research design embraced in this investigation, the present study has some 
methodological limitations, two of which are associated with the adopted approach, a retrospective 
case study. First, this investigation was conducted after the critical event occurred, which could 
generate a recall effect, with interviewees inaccurately recalling the order of the events (Street & 
Ward, 2010). However, the impact of this limitation was contained by concluding the interviews no 
later than 19 days after the fire. Second, retrospective case studies have the potential to produce a 
spoiler effect (Street & Ward, 2010), in which the investigators, aware of the outcomes of the critical 
event, could unintentionally overemphasize aspects of the data analysis and support specific 
conclusions or hypotheses. In order to address this potential limitation, the research team triangulated 
primary sources of information (interviews) with secondary ones (analysis of organizational 
documents) and extensively documented the research process. Further confirmation of the findings 
of the present investigation was drawn from other secondary sources such as the official Fire Brigade 
technical inquiry, the damage assessment technical report and newspaper articles on the event.  
A further limitation of the present study resides in the fact that the research team could not 
record the informal interviews after the event. This was due to the circumstances that characterized 
the event, which entailed extensive investigation by the Police and the Fire Brigade. Given the 
retrospective nature of the case study, researchers preferred to immediately collect data from people 
involved in the event rather than waiting for a more formal interview process to be set up. This 
reduced the latency from the event to the recount and minimized the recall effect that could arise 
(Street & Ward, 2010). The data emerging from the informal interviews were collected by the 
research team and synthesized in the internal report ("Bambino Gesú" Hospital, 2010b) which 
constituted the basis of information for the present paper. Furthermore, in order to leverage ease of 
access to respondents that had been involved in the fire, interviewers were members of the Prevention 
and Protection Service of the hospital. A final research limitation relates to the fact that parents and 
relatives of the patients could not be directly interviewed. Secondary data were nonetheless drawn 
from newspaper articles that reported some of the parents’ and relatives’ perceptions around the fire 
event. 
5. Conclusion 
This case study has emphasized how complex critical infrastructures, such as a pediatric 
hospital, can effectively respond to, and recover from, a major crisis, demonstrating that indispensable 
degree of resilience that healthcare facilities typically need. Adopting a retrospective case study 
approach, this investigation has explored the interventions implemented at the OPBG on the occasion 
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of the fire that affected one of its most critical wards (the ICU) in November 2010. Focus of this 
research was in particular on the post-emergency stages, when resilient organizations manage to learn 
from past crises in order to be able to anticipate, and mitigate the consequences of, future ones. The 
fire event illustrated in this paper did not claim human life, but resulted in a number of injuries and 
post-event conditions treated in the weeks following the emergency. The potential impact on public 
health and the economic damage resulting from the event have demonstrated the importance for 
modern hospitals as critical infrastructures to master emergency management techniques. In an 
institutional context where involved actors belong to different organizations (public and private 
altogether), the supervisory role played by healthcare managers has a growing relevance. Constant 
training, outstanding safety track records and enhanced situational awareness become unavoidable in 
a sector under constant media scrutiny. Furthermore, the economic dimension of modern hospitals is 
gaining growing relevance, especially in terms of sustainability of operations and investments in 
research. As the present case demonstrated, a well-managed emergency can not only reduce human 
and economic costs, but also boost improvement in Healthcare Risk Management. 
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